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THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES 
Leah M. Litman* 
Johnson v. United States held that the “residual clause” of the Armed Ca-
reer Criminal Act (ACCA) is unconstitutionally vague.1 Since Johnson was 
decided six months ago, courts have been sorting out which of the currently 
incarcerated defendants who were sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause 
may be resentenced. Determining who can be resentenced in light of Johnson 
requires courts to answer several questions.2 For example, does the rule in 
Johnson apply retroactively to convictions that have already become final? 
And can prisoners who have already filed one petition for postconviction re-
view—review that occurs after a defendant’s conviction has become final—
file another, successive petition for postconviction review based on Johnson? 
This second question has divided the courts of appeals. It also requires 
the Supreme Court’s immediate and exceptional attention. Under the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a prisoner may file a 
successive petition for postconviction review only when a court of appeals 
panel certifies that the petition involves “a new rule of constitutional law, 
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”3 Less 
than six months after Johnson, over half the courts of appeals disagree about 
whether the Supreme Court has “made” Johnson retroactive and thus wheth-
er a prisoner may file a successive petition for postconviction review based 
on Johnson. 
The Supreme Court must act immediately in order for many of the pris-
oners with Johnson claims to have a remedy. Prisoners generally have one 
year from the date on which the Supreme Court announces a new rule to file 
a successive petition for postconviction—that is, collateral—review.4 But 
 
 * Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Donovan 
McCarty, Andrew Xue, and Megan DeMarco for their extraordinary efforts over the holidays 
to get this piece online. Thanks also to Daniel Deacon, Daniel Epps, Ben Levin, Will Ortman, 
Eve Brensike Primus, and Susannah Barton Tobin for helpful conversations about these ideas, 
and to Luke Beasley for research assistance. 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 2. Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s Potential 
Ruling on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55 (2015). 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2012). 
 4. § 2244(d)(1); § 2255(f)(3). 
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prisoners must also show that the Supreme Court has made that right retro-
active. Therefore, “an applicant who files a . . . successive motion seeking to 
take advantage of a new rule of constitutional law will be time barred except 
in the rare case in which this Court announces a new rule of constitutional 
law and makes it retroactive within one year.”5 The Court decided Johnson 
on June 26, 2015, so prisoners have until June 26, 2016 to file successive peti-
tions for postconviction review and to show that the Court has made John-
son retroactive.6 
The Supreme Court must take some exceptional action to definitively 
make Johnson retroactive and resolve the split among the courts of appeals 
over whether it has made Johnson retroactive. AEDPA bars the Supreme 
Court from taking a petition for certiorari from a court of appeals decision 
granting or denying a prisoner authorization to file a successive petition.7 
The Supreme Court thus cannot make Johnson retroactive—or say that it 
has—by reviewing one of the decisions of the courts of appeals granting or 
denying authorization to file a successive petition for postconviction review. 
And, in the case of Johnson, the Supreme Court cannot grant certiorari to a 
court of appeals decision regarding a first petition for postconviction review. 
The government concedes that Johnson is retroactive,8 and every district 
court but one has accepted that concession and ruled for prisoners who were 
sentenced under ACCA.9 But because that district court did not issue its 
opinion until late November 2015, no court of appeals decision will make its 
way to the Supreme Court in time for the Court to make Johnson retroactive 
within the one-year window in which prisoners may file successive petitions 
for postconviction review. 
That means the Court could make Johnson retroactive in two ways. One, 
the Court could entertain a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus to 
make Johnson retroactive. There are currently several petitions seeking orig-
inal writs of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court,10 and the Court or-
 
 5. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005). 
 6. Because courts of appeals must “grant or deny the authorization to file a second or 
successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion,” prisoners essential-
ly must show the Court has made Johnson retroactive within one year after Johnson. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(D). A court of appeals could, however, hold an application that is filed within the 
one-year statute of limitations for thirty days if the Supreme Court has pending a decision on 
whether Johnson applies retroactively. 
 7. § 2244(b)(3)(E). 
 8. E.g., Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Here, the United 
States concedes that Johnson is retroactive . . . .”). 
 9. Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-cv-00152 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2015). 
 10. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, In re Williams, Nos. 15-758, -759 (U.S. Dec. 11, 
2015); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, In re Sharp, No. 15-646 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2015); Peti-
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dered the Solicitor General of the United States to respond to several of these 
petitions.11 Two, the Court could grant certiorari before judgment in the 
court of appeals to the one district court decision that held Johnson was not 
retroactive.12 The Court will consider both the petitions for original writs of 
habeas corpus and the petition for certiorari before judgment in the court of 
appeals in early January. That gives the Court enough time to hear these cas-
es and issue a decision before the end of the October 2015 Term in June and 
thus make Johnson retroactive before the period to file a successive petition 
expires. 
This Essay argues that the Court should grant one of the petitions for an 
original writ of habeas corpus, or, failing that, the petition for a writ of certi-
orari before judgment. Under the Supreme Court’s own rules, both writs are 
rarely granted: an original writ is granted only under “exceptional circum-
stances,”13 while a petition for certiorari before judgment is granted if the 
case is of “imperative public importance” and “require[s] immediate settle-
ment.”14 There are several reasons why the issue of Johnson retroactivity is 
both exceptional and of considerable public importance: prisoners are cur-
rently serving at least five years longer than their lawful terms of imprison-
ment; the remedy for a Johnson claim is time sensitive; and the United States’ 
litigation posture effectively foreclosed one ordinary avenue by which the 
Court could have made Johnson retroactive. These kinds of considerations fit 
naturally into the equitable analysis that has traditionally governed habeas 
corpus, which is why an original writ of habeas corpus would be an appro-
priate way to make Johnson retroactive. But the government’s lukewarm op-
position to the petition for certiorari before judgment may make that an 
equally, if not more, attractive vehicle to make Johnson retroactive. 
I. JOHNSON RETROACTIVITY 
Federal law imposes a ten-year statutory maximum term of imprison-
ment for defendants who are convicted of being a felon in possession of a 
 
tion for Writ of Habeas Corpus, In re Triplett, No. 15-626 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2015). One additional 
petition was mooted after the district court granted relief on a separate claim. Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus, In re Butler, No. 15-578 (U.S. Nov. 4, 2015); Order Granting Writ of Habeas 
Corpus and Directing Immediate Release of Petitioner, Butler v. McClintock, No. 4:15-cv-321-
TUC-DCB (D. Ariz. Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ 
15-321joint-emergency-motion-for-release-proposed-order.pdf [perma.cc/HSJ5-CLHW]. 
 11. E.g., Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, In re Sharp, No. 15-646 (U.S. Nov. 16, 
2015). 
 12. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment and Motion for Leave to Proceed 
in Forma Pauperis, Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-7426 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2015). 
 13. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 665 (1996) (quoting SUP. CT. R. 20.4(a)). 
 14. SUP. CT. R. 11. 
84 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 114:81 
 
 
firearm.15 However, ACCA imposes a fifteen-year term of imprisonment for 
defendants with three or more prior convictions for violent felonies or seri-
ous drug offenses.16 ACCA’s “residual clause” defined a violent felony as any 
crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”17 
Johnson held the residual clause unconstitutionally void for vagueness.18 
Defendants convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm therefore 
cannot receive a fifteen-year term of imprisonment under ACCA’s residual 
clause; the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for their offense of 
conviction is ten years. 
What about defendants whose convictions have already become final?19 
Generally, “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be appli-
cable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are an-
nounced.”20 But new rules apply “retroactively” to cases that have become 
final where the new rule is “substantive”21or is a “watershed rule[] of crimi-
nal procedure.”22 Substantive rules include “decisions that narrow the scope 
of a criminal statute.”23 A rule is substantive if it creates “‘a significant risk 
that a defendant . . . faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon 
him.”24 
In April, before Johnson was decided, I argued that “[a] decision invali-
dating ACCA’s residual clause would be substantive and therefore should 
apply retroactively to defendants sentenced under ACCA whose convictions 
have already become final.”25 I won’t fully explain that reasoning here, but 
for now it is important to note two things. First, the only court that has held 
that Johnson is not retroactive in an initial petition for postconviction review 
is the Northern District of Texas, in a decision on November 19, 2015.26 Sec-
 
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012). 
 16. § 924(e)(1). 
 17. § 924(e)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). 
 18. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015). 
 19. A criminal case becomes final when the time to file a petition for certiorari has ex-
pired, or the Supreme Court has denied a petition for certiorari. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 
44 (2011) (“Finality occurs when direct state appeals have been exhausted and a petition for 
writ of certiorari from this Court has become time barred or has been disposed of.”). 
 20. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). 
 21. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004). 
 22. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693–94 
(1971)). 
 23. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–52. 
 24. Id. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)). 
 25. Litman, supra note 2, at 61. 
 26. Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-cv-00152 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2015). 
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ond, the United States is conceding in the district courts and the courts of 
appeals that the rule invalidating ACCA’s residual clause is retroactive.27 
II. TO “MAKE” JOHNSON RETROACTIVE 
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 
prisoners may file a successive petition for postconviction review only when 
a court of appeals panel certifies that the petition involves “a new rule of 
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Su-
preme Court, that was previously unavailable.”28 That is, a prisoner may file 
a successive petition for postconviction review once a new rule has been 
made retroactive by the Supreme Court, as opposed to by a court of appeals.29 
Less than six months after Johnson, three courts of appeals—the Fifth Cir-
cuit,30 the Tenth Circuit,31 and the Eleventh Circuit32—have held that the 
Supreme Court has not “made” Johnson retroactive. In these three circuits, a 
successive petition for postconviction review under § 2255 is not a remedy 
that is available to vindicate a Johnson claim. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court cannot review these courts of appeals de-
cisions. Another AEDPA provision provides that “[t]he grant or denial of an 
authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive applica-
tion . . . shall not be the subject of a petition for . . . a writ of certiorari.”33 
Therefore, even though the courts of appeals disagree about whether the Su-
preme Court has made Johnson retroactive—the First,34 Second,35 Sixth,36 
Seventh,37 and Ninth Circuits38 have all granted authorization to file succes-
sive petitions—the Supreme Court cannot resolve that circuit split in the 
usual manner by granting a petition for certiorari to review one of the de-
terminations of the courts of appeals. 
This Part argues the Court could resolve the split among the courts of 
appeals—and ensure that prisoners with Johnson claims have a remedy—by 
 
 27. See supra note 8. 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2012). 
 29. E.g., Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661–62 (2001) (interpreting similarly worded pro-
vision in § 2244, which is applicable to state-court prisoners, in this way). 
 30. In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 31. In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 32. In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 33. § 2244(b)(3)(E). 
 34. Pakala v. United States, 804 F.3d 139 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 35. Order, Rivera v. United States, No. 13-4654 (2nd Cir. Oct. 5, 2015). 
 36. In re Wendy Watkins, No. 15-5038 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2015), http:// 
www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0295p-06.pdf [perma.cc/E8QM-YKVZ]. 
 37. Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 38. Order, United States v. Striet, No. 15-72506 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2015). 
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entertaining a petition for an “original” writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241 provides that “writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme 
Court.”39 This provision allows a prisoner to file a petition for a writ of habe-
as corpus directly in the Supreme Court, rather than seeking certiorari from 
a decision of a court of appeals or district court about whether to grant a pe-
tition for postconviction review. 
But as Supreme Court Rule 20 makes clear, “This writ is rarely grant-
ed.”40 “To justify the granting of a writ of habeas corpus [under section 
2241], the petitioner must show that exceptional circumstances warrant the 
exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers and that adequate relief cannot 
be obtained in any other form or from any other court.”41 The United States 
has conceded that prisoners in the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits can-
not obtain otherwise “adequate relief”42 because successive petitions are un-
available to prisoners in these circuits.43 Two additional considerations—
besides the unavailability of successive petitions for postconviction review—
warrant the exercise of the Court’s original habeas jurisdiction: timing, espe-
cially given the nature of Johnson claims, and other exceptional circumstanc-
es unique to the litigation concerning Johnson retroactivity. 
In the alternative, the Court should grant certiorari before judgment in 
the court of appeals in Harrimon v. United States, the district court decision 
that held Johnson was not retroactive.44 The Court’s rules also make certiora-
ri before judgment a rarity: a petition for certiorari before judgment “will be 
granted only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public im-
portance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require 
immediate settlement in this Court.”45 The reasons that the Court should en-
tertain an original writ also suggest that the issue of Johnson retroactivity 
“require[s] immediate settlement.” Prisoners are currently serving unlawful 
sentences at least five years longer than their lawful terms of imprisonment 
without an adequate remedy; this is also an issue of “imperative public im-
portance.” 
 
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2012). 
 40. SUP. CT. R. 20.4(a). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 12, In re Sharp, No. 15-646 (U.S. Dec. 
16, 2015). 
 43. Litman, supra note 2, at 75–76 (explaining this argument). 
 44. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 45. SUP. CT. R. 11. 
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A. Original Writs 
1. Timing 
Prisoners have one year to file a successive petition from “the date on 
which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court.”46 
Dodd v. United States held that the statute of limitations period begins when 
the Court recognizes the new right, not when it makes the right retroactive, 
even though prisoners must also show that the Supreme Court has made a 
right retroactive to receive authorization to file a successive petition. “[A]n 
applicant who files a second or successive motion seeking to take advantage 
of a new rule of constitutional law will be time barred except in the rare case 
in which this Court announces a new rule of constitutional law and makes it 
retroactive within one year.”47 Thus, if the Supreme Court makes Johnson 
retroactive, it needs to do so less than one year after Johnson—the new rule—
was decided, which was June 26, 2015. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has held that, in rare circumstances, 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations may be “tolled” for prisoners to file untimely 
petitions for postconviction review.48 In particular, the statute of limitations 
is tolled for “fundamental miscarriage[s] of justice,” which includes cases in 
which the defendant establishes he or she is actually innocent.49 It might be 
the case that prisoners who were sentenced to an unlawful mandatory mini-
mum—a term of imprisonment exceeding the statutory maximum for their 
offense of conviction—are actually innocent of their sentences.50 More than 
a decade ago, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a pris-
oner can be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence.51 But it ultimately 
disposed of the case on other grounds.52 It is possible that a split could de-
velop among the courts of appeals about whether prisoners can be “actually 
innocent” of ACCA’s mandatory minimum; that the Supreme Court could 
grant certiorari in such a case; and that it would resolve the case on those 
grounds and say that the statute of limitations is tolled when the prisoner 
shows he or she is actually innocent of his or her sentence. 
 
 46. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012); § 2255(f)(3). 
 47. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357–59 (2005). 
 48. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). 
 49. Id. at 1931. 
 50. Litman, supra note 2, at 65–73 (explaining this argument). 
 51. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388–89 (2004). 
 52. Id. (“[T]he question before us is whether this exception applies where an applicant 
asserts ‘actual innocence’ of a noncapital sentence. Because the District Court failed first to 
consider alternative grounds for relief . . . that might obviate any need to reach the actual inno-
cence question, we vacate . . . and remand.”). 
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But this hypothetical scenario ignores how the nature of Johnson claims 
makes prompt Supreme Court intervention a necessary part of any adequate 
remedy. Under ACCA, prisoners received a fifteen-year term of imprison-
ment, but Johnson means that the statutory maximum term of imprisonment 
for these prisoners was ten years. The “remedy” for Johnson claims, there-
fore, is to ensure that a prisoner does not serve more than a ten-year term of 
imprisonment. But many prisoners are well into that ten-year term; some 
have already served more than ten years.53 Indeed, it is the prisoners who 
have already served well into their ten years—and thus are at a point at 
which they are seeking to file successive petitions for postconviction re-
view—who lack a remedy for a Johnson claim. Waiting for a circuit split to 
develop, or waiting for a case that perfectly presents the question of whether 
an actual innocence claim concerning a sentence tolls AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations, means that many prisoners will serve more than their lawful 
terms of imprisonment. For these prisoners, there will be no adequate reme-
dy without immediate Supreme Court attention.54 A remedy that comes too 
late—after these prisoners have served their lawful terms of imprisonment—
is no remedy at all. 
2. Exceptional Circumstances Unique to Johnson 
The way in which Johnson claims have been litigated is another excep-
tional circumstance that warrants the Court entertaining a petition for an 
original writ. In most cases, it is hypothetically possible for the Court to 
“make” a rule retroactive by applying that rule to a case on collateral review. 
But these kinds of cases will not make their way to the Supreme Court with 
regard to Johnson retroactivity. The government concedes that Johnson ap-
plies retroactively, and it is waiving all procedural objections to resentencing 
defendants who were sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause.55 Courts had, 
 
 53. Joint Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 for an Order Authorizing District 
Court to Consider a Successive Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 at 10–11, United States v. 
Striet, No. 15-72506 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2015) (“Mr. Striet has already served more time than the 
maximum term for the offense of conviction . . . .”); Joint Emergency Motion for an Order Au-
thorizing District Court to Reconsider a Successive Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 at 10, Reli-
ford v. United States, No. 15-3224 (8th Cir. Oct. 6, 2015) (“Reliford has already served more 
time than the maximum term for the offense of conviction . . . .”). 
 54. For similar reasons, it also does not make sense for the Supreme Court to wait for a 
case involving the career offender Guideline. See Leah Litman, Circuit Splits & Original Writs, 
CASETEXT (Dec. 17, 2015), https://casetext.com/posts/circuit-splits-original-writs [per-
ma.cc/8LTY-PQNB]. 
 55. See, e.g., Gov’t’s Response to Appellant’s Motion for Summary Action at 5, United 
States v. Imm, No. 14-4809 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 2015), (“The government further waives any objec-
tion based on procedural default . . . .”); Joint Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 for 
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until the end of November, uniformly accepted the government’s conces-
sions in first petitions for postconviction review. Because these cases are fa-
vorable to prisoners, and the United States agrees that prisoners should be 
resentenced, there is no first petition for postconviction review that the 
Court could take to make Johnson retroactive. 
The government has also taken pains to avoid having to fall back on an 
original writ of habeas corpus. The United States has urged courts of appeals 
to grant prisoners authorization to file second or successive petitions, at least 
if prisoners were sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause.56 Some courts 
have turned these concessions into a reason why the courts are granting au-
thorization to file second or successive petitions.57 But the Fifth Circuit, for 
example, ignored the United States’ submission that “[t]he government does 
not object to the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive § 2255 mo-
tion.”58 
In several writings, Professor Vladeck has also urged the Court to use its 
power to entertain original writs to resolve the circuit split about whether the 
Supreme Court has made Johnson retroactive.59 Vladeck notes that the Court 
 
an Order Authorizing District Court to Consider a Successive Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
at 4, United States v. Striet, No. 15-72506 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2015) (“In light of Johnson, the par-
ties agree that Mr. Striet is actually innocent of being an armed career criminal . . . .”). 
 56. Joint Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 for an Order Authorizing District 
Court to Consider a Successive Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, United States v. Striet, No. 15-
72506 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2015); Joint Emergency Motion for an Order Authorizing District 
Court to Reconsider a Successive Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Reliford v. United States, 
No. 15-3224 (8th Cir. Oct. 6, 2015). 
 57. E.g., Pakala v. United States, 804 F.3d 139, 139–40 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Evans-
Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 240 (1st Cir. 2014)) (“In view of the government’s con-
cessions, we certify that Pakala has made the requisite prima facie showing that the new consti-
tutional rule announced in Johnson ‘qualifies as a basis for habeas relief on a second or succes-
sive petition . . . .’ “); Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Martin 
v. Symmes, 782 F.3d 939, 945 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e have previously accepted the govern-
ment’s concession of retroactivity of a new Supreme Court rule as a sufficient prima facie 
showing to allow a second or successive § 2255 petition.”). 
 58. Response by the United States to Defendant’s Motion for Authorization to File a 
Successive or Second Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
at 6, In re Williams, No 15-30731 (5th Cir. Sept. 24, 2015). 
 59. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Using the Supreme Court’s Original Habeas Jurisdiction 
to “Ma[k]e” New Rules Retroactive, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. (forthcoming 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2698351 [perma.cc/Y36N-F7MM] [here-
inafter Vladeck, New Rules]; Brief of Law Professors As Amicus Curiae In Support of Petition-
ers (U.S. No. 15-578), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/In-re-
Butler_Amicus_LawProfs.pdf [perma.cc/5JHU-LYTD]; Steve Vladeck, The Johnson Retroac-
tivity Circuit Split Plot Thickens, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 4, 2015, 10:28 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/12/the-johnson-retroactivity-circuit-split-
plot-thickens.html [perma.cc/4QJ2-6SJ7]; Steve Vladeck, How an Obscure SCOTUS Procedure 
Can Solve AEDPA’s Retroactivity Catch-22 (and a Growing Circuit Split), PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 
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has said it might not entertain a petition for an original writ if federal stat-
utes restrict the Court’s ability to grant relief on the claim being raised in the 
petition.60 For example, AEDPA restricts the standards by which federal 
courts review claims of error if a state court has adjudicated those claims.61 
But the Court’s review of whether it has made Johnson retroactive would be 
de novo, although there are other statutory restrictions on the availability of 
habeas corpus.62 Moreover, only the Supreme Court can make Johnson ret-
roactive for purposes of AEDPA’s gatekeeping provisions. And Dodd 
acknowledged that, under AEDPA, Congress contemplated that the Court 
would have the means to do so—that the Court could “announce[] a new 
rule of constitutional law and make[] it retroactive within one year.”63 Vla-
deck also notes that there have been few situations in which federal courts 
have been divided over whether the Supreme Court has made a rule retroac-
tive.64 Therefore, using the Court’s original jurisdiction to resolve those dis-
putes would not lead to a large number of original habeas petitions.65 
The nature of Johnson claims also means that other ways in which the 
Court could make Johnson retroactive would not provide “adequate relief” to 
prisoners with Johnson claims. For example, the Supreme Court could grant 
review in a case in which a court of appeals authorized the filing of a second 
or successive petition and the district court and court of appeals then heard 
the petition on the merits.66 But the sheer length of time it would take these 
petitions to reach the Court would mean that such a decision would certainly 
happen outside of the year-long window prisoners have to file second or 
successive petitions. And a later-in-time decision holding Johnson retroac-
 
16, 2015, 10:54 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/11/how-an-obscure-
scotus-procedure-can-solve-aedpas-retroactivity-catch-22-and-a-growing-circuit-split.html 
[perma.cc/GXN6-VPGN]. 
 60. See, e.g., Vladeck, New Rules, supra note 59. 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) provides that “An application for a writ of habeas corpus in be-
half of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to [§ 2255], shall not 
be entertained if it appears that . . . [a] court has denied him relief [under § 2255], unless it also 
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his deten-
tion.” § 2255(e); see Litman, supra note 2, at 75–76 (suggesting § 2255 remedy would be inade-
quate for Johnson claims if the Court did not make Johnson retroactive). 
 63. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 354 (2005). 
 64. See, e.g., Vladeck, New Rules, supra note 59. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (reviewing postconviction proceedings 
that had been adjudicated on the merits after permission was granted to file such a petition). 
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tive might mean that many prisoners serve more than their lawful ten-year 
terms of imprisonment.67 
B. Other Extraordinary Writs 
In addition to an “original” writ of habeas corpus, the Court has two 
other options that it could use to make Johnson retroactive. Both are other 
kinds of extraordinary writs: the writ of mandamus and the writ of certiorari 
before judgment. While mandamus is unlikely, the Court could grant a writ 
of certiorari before judgment in Harrimon. The United States appears to pre-
fer a grant of certiorari in Harrimon over an original writ of habeas corpus. 
The United States’ stated preference might, by itself, be reason enough for 
the Court to grant certiorari in Harrimon instead of an original writ even if 
the United States’ explanation for its preference is not persuasive. The Court 
should not, however, defer consideration of Johnson retroactivity in the hope 
that the United States will waive any statute of limitations defense it might 
have. 
One alternative to granting certiorari in a case seeking an original writ of 
habeas corpus would be to grant certiorari in a case seeking a writ of man-
damus. A writ of mandamus orders a court of appeals (or district court) to 
take some action.68 The AEDPA provision barring petitions for certiorari 
from a court of appeals decision granting or denying authorization to file a 
successive petition doesn’t bar petitions seeking writs of mandamus.69 And 
there is currently a petition before the Supreme Court in which the prisoner 
is seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the court of appeals to grant him au-
thorization to file a successive petition.70 
But writs of mandamus, like original writs of habeas corpus, are reserved 
for “exceptional circumstances.”71 The Court has also said that writs of man-
damus are available only when it is “clear and indisputable” that the peti-
tioner is entitled to relief.72 The petition seeking mandamus may not satisfy 
that criteria for two reasons. First, it is not clear that the petitioner in that 
 
 67. See Leah M. Litman, Resentencing in the Shadow of Johnson v. United States, 28 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 45 (2015). 
 68. See generally Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
Writs of mandamus are available under the All Writs Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (2012); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 666 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 70. Brief for the United States in Opposition, In re Triplett, No 15-625 (U.S. Dec. 9, 
2015). The petitioner in In re Sharp asked for a writ of mandamus as an alternative to an origi-
nal writ of habeas corpus. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11 n.5, In re Sharp, No. 
15-646 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2015). 
 71. SUP. CT. R. 20.4(a). 
 72. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381. 
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case received an unlawful sentence—as the United States noted in its brief in 
opposition, the prisoner had three convictions for “serious drug offenses.”73 
ACCA imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum if the prisoner had three 
or more convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses,74 and John-
son did not invalidate the provision imposing an enhanced sentence when a 
prisoner has convictions for three or more serious drug offenses. Because the 
petitioner seeking mandamus did not necessarily receive an unlawful sen-
tence, he may not have a “clear and indisputable” claim to relief. Second, it is 
not necessarily “clear and indisputable” that the court of appeals erred by 
concluding the Court has not made Johnson retroactive. Tyler v. Cain held 
that the “only way the Supreme Court” can “make” a rule retroactive “is 
through a holding,”75 and three courts of appeals have relied on Tyler to say 
that the Supreme Court has not made Johnson retroactive. 
The Court could also grant a petition seeking certiorari before judgment 
in a case involving a first petition for postconviction review. No court of ap-
peals has held that Johnson is not retroactive in a first petition for postcon-
viction review. But one district court has, and it is conceivable that the Su-
preme Court could review the judgment of that district court without 
waiting for a court of appeals decision. Federal law provides that “[a]n appli-
cation to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review a case before 
judgment has been rendered in the court of appeals may be made at any time 
before judgment.”76 But petitions for certiorari before judgment—like peti-
tions seeking original writs of habeas corpus or writs of mandamus—are not 
frequently granted. The Supreme Court’s rules state that a petition seeking 
certiorari before judgment “will be granted only upon a showing that the 
case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from 
normal appellate practice and to require immediate settlement in this 
Court.”77 
The prisoner in Harrimon—the district court decision finding that John-
son is not retroactive—has filed a petition seeking certiorari before judg-
ment.78 And although the government’s response wasn’t due until January 
19, 2016,79 the United States filed its brief in opposition on December 22, 
 
 73. Brief of United States in Opposition at 17–20, In re Triplett, No 15-625, (U.S. Dec. 9, 
2015). 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
 75. 553 U.S.656, 663 (2001). 
 76. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e). 
 77. SUP. CT. R. 11. 
 78. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment and Motion for Leave to Proceed 
in Forma Pauperis, Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-7426 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2015). 
 79. Id. 
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2015.80 The Court will consider the petition at its January 8 conference. Typ-
ically, cases granted before the middle of January are heard during the 
Court’s current Term, and so a decision in Harrimon could come before 
June 2016.81 
The United States appears to prefer the Court grant the petition seeking 
certiorari before judgment rather than one of the petitions seeking an origi-
nal writ of habeas corpus, as its expedited reply in Harrimon suggests. The 
United States argued that the Court “should . . . den[y]” the petitions of pris-
oners seeking original writs of habeas corpus because they have “not shown 
that exceptional circumstances exist to warrant” an original writ of habeas 
corpus.82 But it used more tepid language in its brief in opposition to the pe-
tition for certiorari before judgment in Harrimon: “The petition for a writ of 
certiorari before judgment should be denied unless this Court concludes that 
the criteria [for granting such a petition] are satisfied, in which case the peti-
tion should be granted.”83 And the United States suggested there might be an 
argument for why the criteria were satisfied: “[R]esolution of the retroactivi-
ty of Johnson in petitioner’s case would have wider legal and practical im-
portance for the larger class of prisoners who need authorization to file sec-
ond or successive motions.”84 
However, the reason the United States prefers a petition for certiorari 
before judgment over an original writ of habeas corpus is a bit odd. The 
United States suggested that the prisoners seeking original writs of habeas 
corpus had not met the “strict criteria that govern the issuance of the ex-
traordinary writ” because “other, more traditional ways exist by which the 
issue could reach th[e] Court,” and named Harrimon as such a vehicle.85 But 
certiorari before judgment is not a “traditional” way an issue reaches the 
Court, and there are similarly “strict criteria” that govern when the Court 
grants certiorari before judgment.86 The United States also did not concede 
that those criteria were satisfied, nor did it explicitly urge the Court to grant 
certiorari in Harrimon. Rather, it urged the Court to deny the petition, un-
less the Court concluded the criteria for granting certiorari before judgment 
 
 80. Brief for the United States, Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-7426 (U.S. Dec. 22, 
2015). 
 81. SCOTUSBLOG, STATISTICS: PACE OF GRANTS, http://www.scotusblog.com/statistics/ 
[perma.cc/J5N6-S9YX]. 
 82. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 14, In re Sharp, No. 15-646 (U.S. Dec. 
16, 2015). 
 83. Brief for the United States at 32, Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-7426 (U.S. Dec. 
22, 2015). 
 84. Id. at 12. 
 85. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 14, In re Sharp, No. 15-646 (U.S. Dec. 
16, 2015). 
 86. Id. at 11. 
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were satisfied. And it suggested that Harrimon, “standing on its own, does 
not appear to satisfy the ‘very demanding standard’ “ for “certiorari [before 
judgment].”87 
The United States is correct that petitions for certiorari before judgment 
are more “traditional” than original writs of habeas corpus in one sense: the 
Court has occasionally granted certiorari before judgment. But the Court has 
often done so when the United States has sought certiorari and urged the 
Court to grant certiorari before judgment.88 Given that the United States’ 
views appear to be a factor in whether the Court grants certiorari before 
judgment, it’s unfortunate that the United States did not argue that the 
Court should grant certiorari before judgment in Harrimon. It’s doubly un-
fortunate because the United States suggested that the possibility of certiora-
ri in Harrimon was a reason not to grant the petitions seeking original writs 
of habeas corpus. And it’s triply unfortunate because the United States’ posi-
tion is that prisoners sentenced under ACCA are entitled to relief on the 
merits: it represented to district courts, courts of appeals, and now the Su-
preme Court, that it believes both that Johnson is a substantive rule that ap-
plies retroactively, and that the Court has made Johnson retroactive such that 
prisoners should be granted authorization to file successive petitions for 
postconviction review. 
The United States represented that Harrimon is meaningfully different 
from cases in which the Court granted certiorari before judgment to resolve 
the constitutionality of a wide-reaching federal statute, such as the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, which apply in every sentencing in every federal court.89 But 
it offered that “the Court may conclude that petitioner’s case is of ‘impera-
tive public importance’ “ because it is “important to the fair and proper ad-
ministration of federal criminal justice” that prisoners not serve more than 
their lawful terms of imprisonment.90 In these respects, Harrimon is similar 
to Barefoot v. Estelle, which granted certiorari before judgment to resolve the 
 
 87. Brief for the United States at 12, Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-7426 (U.S. Dec. 
22, 2015). 
 88. United States v. Fanfan, 542 U.S. 956 (2004); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974). Several of these cases involved international or military affairs. See James Lindgren & 
William P. Marshall, The Supreme Court’s Extraordinary Power to Grant Certiorari Before 
Judgment in the Court of Appeals, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 259 (1986) (listing cases). Other times the 
Court has granted certiorari before judgment to consolidate cases when it is already hearing a 
similar case. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002); Fanfan, 542 U.S. 956. 
 89. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361 (1989); Brief for the United States at 26, Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-7426 (U.S. Dec. 
22, 2015). 
 90. Brief for the United States at 24, 26, Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-7426 (U.S. 
Dec. 22, 2015). 
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proper standard for granting stays of execution.91 The number of affected 
prisoners may not be large,92 but the import of the issue for the affected pris-
oners, and for the broader criminal justice system, is. 
There is one additional point about Harrimon: the case is (currently) in 
a somewhat quirky procedural posture—the issuance of a certificate of ap-
pealability (COA). Appeals are ordinarily available as a matter of right. But 
AEDPA does not allow a prisoner to appeal from the denial of a petition for 
postconviction review unless the prisoner obtains a COA from the district 
court or court of appeals.93 The district court, in the order denying Harri-
mon’s petition, also denied him a COA.94 The prisoner has filed a notice of 
appeal—effectively a request for a COA—to the Fifth Circuit.95 A COA is 
“jurisdictional”—meaning an appellate court does not have the power to ad-
judicate the petition for postconviction review on the merits until a COA has 
issued.96 But the Supreme Court nonetheless has “jurisdiction” over Harri-
mon because the application for a COA in the court of appeals is a “case be-
fore the court of appeals” that the Supreme Court has the power to review.97 
If the Fifth Circuit does not issue a COA before the Court hears Harri-
mon, however, the Supreme Court would technically be reviewing, before 
judgment in the court of appeals, whether Harrimon is entitled to a COA. 
Whether a prisoner is entitled to a COA is not exactly the same question as 
whether the prisoner is entitled to relief. Rather, in determining whether a 
COA should issue, the question is whether “reasonable jurists could debate 
whether . . . [the district court’s decision] should have been resolved in a dif-
ferent manner.”98 Because the COA standard would not require the Court to 
say whether Johnson is or is not retroactive, but instead whether reasonable 
jurists could debate that it’s not, granting a COA in Harrimon might not def-
initely make Johnson retroactive. The Court could, however, in granting the 
 
 91. 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
 92. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., Death Row U.S.A., April 1, 
2015, http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSA_Spring_2015.pdf [perma.cc/VM7K-
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ers are sentenced each year under ACCA. The number of individuals in prison who were sen-
tenced under ACCA, therefore, may be over 6,000, given that each prisoner would have been 
sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Litman, supra note 2 at 59. Of course, not all of these pris-
oners were sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause. 
 93. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2012); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 647–49 (2012). 
 94. Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-cv-00152 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2015). 
 95. United States v. Harrimon, No. 15-11175 (5th Cir. Nov. 23, 2015). 
 96. Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 647–49. 
 97. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 241 (1998) (“There can be little doubt that 
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 98. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 
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COA make Johnson retroactive by stating that it had determined all “reason-
able jurists . . . [would] agree that” Johnson is retroactive.99 
Finally, the reasons Johnson retroactivity is of “exceptional public im-
portance” fit naturally into the equitable analysis that has traditionally gov-
erned habeas corpus. When Holland v. Florida held that AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations was subject to equitable tolling, it acknowledged that Congress, 
in AEDPA, had generally sought to restrict the availability of postconviction 
review.100 But Holland explained: “‘[E]quitable principles’ have traditionally 
‘governed’ the substantive law of habeas corpus.”101 And while Congress had, 
in AEDPA, restricted federal postconviction review, it sought “to do so 
without undermining basic habeas corpus principles False [I]t did so without 
losing sight of the fact that the ‘writ of habeas corpus plays a vital role in pro-
tecting constitutional rights.’ “102 The reasons to resolve Johnson retroactivity 
are to do just that—to ensure that prisoners do not serve more than their 
lawful terms of imprisonment; to provide a remedy that is only a real remedy 
if it is available before prisoners serve their lawful terms of imprisonment; 
and to compensate for the government’s litigation posture, which, while ad-
mirable, effectively foreclosed other avenues to make Johnson retroactive. 
The Court should not shy away from acknowledging that, even after 
AEDPA, considerations of fairness and solicitude for constitutional rights 
continue to have a role in federal postconviction review. 
The United States suggested, between the lines, that if the Court were to 
wait for the perfect vehicle to make Johnson retroactive it might “waive” its 
statute of limitations defense as a reason for a court not to grant a successive 
petition for postconviction review in the event the Court eventually makes 
Johnson retroactive.103 The Court should not use that a reason to wait for the 
perfect vehicle. One, there is no guarantee that the United States—especially 
in an unknown future administration that will come into office in January 
2017—will waive the statute of limitations defense. Two, even if the United 
States does waive that defense, courts do not uniformly accept the United 
States’ concessions, even if they are supposed to. Courts denied authoriza-
 
 99. Id. 
 100. 560 U.S. 631 (2010). 
 101. Holland, 560 U.S. at 646. 
 102. Id. at 648–49. 
 103. Brief of United States in Opposition at 19, In re Sharp, No 15-646 (U.S. Dec. 2015) 
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but see Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1830 (2012) (explaining that a court may not “bypass, 
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tion to file successive petitions for postconviction review even though the 
United States urged them to grant authorization. And courts have refused to 
resentence defendants who were sentenced under the career-offender Guide-
line even though the United States has maintained that they should be resen-
tenced.104 Therefore, unless the Court wants to police when courts are abus-
ing their discretion by overriding the United States’ waiver of its statute of 
limitations defense, it should say, this Term, that Johnson is retroactive.105 
CONCLUSION 
The petitions for original writs of habeas corpus raising questions about 
Johnson’s retroactivity will test whether the Court will keep its word that 
original writs of habeas corpus are a real backstop for AEDPA’s restrictions 
on postconviction review. Concurring in Felker, Justice Souter envisioned 
the Court could use one of the other writs at its disposal in a case in which 
“the courts of appeals adopted divergent interpretations of the gatekeeper 
standard.”106 These circumstances have come to pass: the circuits disagree 
about whether the Court has “made” a rule retroactive. There are also fea-
tures unique to the Johnson litigation that constitute the kinds of “exception-
al circumstances” that should warrant a rare exercise of the Court’s power to 
entertain original writs of habeas corpus. The government’s litigation pos-
ture—and the near unanimity among the courts that prisoners sentenced 
under ACCA are entitled to some relief—removed other, more traditional 
vehicles for the Supreme Court to make Johnson retroactive. The rule in 
Johnson also concerns the legality of a term of years sentence, and some pris-
oners have already served much of—if not more than—their lawful terms of 
imprisonment, which now cannot exceed ten years. A remedy for a Johnson 
claim must be made available now to ensure that prisoners do not serve 
more than their lawful terms of imprisonment. 
If the Court does not entertain a petition seeking an original writ of ha-
beas corpus, however, it should grant certiorari in Harrimon before a judg-
ment of the court of appeals. There is no perfect vehicle for resolving wheth-
er the Court has made Johnson retroactive. But the Court should not wait for 
one. Time is more important than a case in the perfect procedural posture, 
both with respect to the petitions seeking original writs of habeas corpus and 
with respect to the petition seeking certiorari before judgment in Harrimon. 
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